Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in th... Infodoc

Accueil

Adresse

Infodoc : Réseau des bibliothèques et centres de documentation d'AgroParisTech

France

contact

Array
(
    [TITRE] => <b>Type de document : </b>
    [TITRE_CLEAN] => Type de document
    [OPAC_SHOW] => 1
    [TYPE] => list
    [AFF] => Article
    [ID] => 4
    [NAME] => cp_typdoc
    [DATATYPE] => integer
    [VALUES] => Array
        (
            [0] => 8
        )

)

Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in the management of trans-boundary rivers

Titre :	Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in the management of trans-boundary rivers Ajouter au panier
in	Water policy , Vol. 11 n° 2, 16/02/2009
Auteur(s) :	I. Dombrowsky
Type de document :	Article
Sujets :	benefit sharing ; benefits of cooperation ; enforcement ; negative and positive unidirectional externalities ; property rights ; trans boundary rivers ; EAUX TRANSFRONTIERES Eaux internationales
Résumé :	The paper argues that it is useful to distinguish negative and positive unidirectional externality problems related to the use of trans-boundary rivers, as these two cases represent fundamentally different cooperation problems. In the case of negative externalities, the benefits of cooperation exist in principle, but their realization requires an agreement on often disputed property rights as well as on the set up of an enforcement mechanism. Thus cooperation remains institutionally demanding. In contrast, in the case of positive externality problems, no property rights issues are involved. However, whether cooperation can be expected depends on the underlying payoff structure. The downstream riparian can be expected to participate in the provision of a positive externality upstream, [...] The paper argues that it is useful to distinguish negative and positive unidirectional externality problems related to the use of trans-boundary rivers, as these two cases represent fundamentally different cooperation problems. In the case of negative externalities, the benefits of cooperation exist in principle, but their realization requires an agreement on often disputed property rights as well as on the set up of an enforcement mechanism. Thus cooperation remains institutionally demanding. In contrast, in the case of positive externality problems, no property rights issues are involved. However, whether cooperation can be expected depends on the underlying payoff structure. The downstream riparian can be expected to participate in the provision of a positive externality upstream, either if the project is only collectively rational (coordination problem) or if the downstream riparian's participation allows for a Pareto improvement vis-à-vis the non- cooperative solution (cooperation problem).
Article en page(s) :	125 - 140
Langue(s) :	Anglais
Lien vers la notice :	https://infodoc.agroparistech.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=136726

Réserver

Exemplaires (1)

Localisation	Emplacement	Pôle	Section	Cote	Support	Disponibilité
Montpellier			Périodiques Montpellier	sans cote	Papier Périodique	Empruntable Disponible

Infodoc : Réseau des bibliothèques et centres de documentation d'AgroParisTech

Se connecter

Infodoc : Sciences, Techniques et Culture

Accueil

Sélection de la langue

Adresse

Exemplaires (1)